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1,0	 INTRODUCTION
This document presents the Reliability Program Plan to be implemented on the
`	 HRUV Spectrometer/Polarimeter Electronics Assy Program at SCI Systems, Inc.
i
This document is submitted for review by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
as a data submittal for contract NAS8-.32035.
1
This document will be the governing document for the reliability tasks to be
I	 accomplished during the program. This plan is in basic conformance to the
requirements of NHB5300(lA), Reliability Program Provisions for Space System
i
Contractors, and is intended to provide an effective guide towards achievement
of the reliability requirements contained in_GSFC Document SMM-300-01 Revision A.
1
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p2.0	 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents form a part of this progr;Lm plan to the extent specified
herein.
GSFC SPECIFICATIONS
PPL 12	 GSFC Preferred Parts List Number 12
(Notices 1 ar:d 2)
SMM-300-01	 Reliability -.nd Quality Assurance Specification
for SMM Instruments
NASA DOCUMENTS
NHB5300.4 (1A)	 Reliability P:?ogram Provisions for Space System
Contractors.
MILITARY DOCUMENTS
MIL-M-38510	 Microcircuits, General Specification for
MIL-STD-975 (NASA)	 Standard Parts List for Flight and Mission-
i
	3.0	 RE ULA3ILITY MANAGEMENT
The rcliar.tity tasks required for the program will be .conducted by the Relia-
bility Engineering Section. The activities of this section are directed by a
Reliability Supervisor who reports to the Quality and Reliability Assurance
Manager. The Reliability Supervisor is charged with the responsibility of
providing the Program Manager with specialized support in the reliability
disciplines. This will then allow the Program Manager to comply with the
program requirements in this specialty area without bearing the burden of
detail involvement in the daily activities of the reliability efforts. This
organization provides a single source of responsibility to enforce the relia-
bility policies and the authority to ensure necessary actions consistent with
the reliability program requirements.
In summary, the reliability function will be managed as to maintain the integrity
of the hardware through the established disciplines of the reliability trade.
This will assure the customer that the deliverable items will meet the mission
i
requirements throughout their intended lifetime.
i
	3.1	 ORGANIZATION
Figure 3-1 indicates the administrative organization by which the reliability
section will be governed in its relationship to the HRUV Spectrometer/Polarimeter
i^Electronics Assembly Program. With the aid of this chart it is easily seen that
the separate hierachy of program engineering and reliability are maintained.
This arrangement provides a close functional relationship between the respective
groups while providing the separate administrative paths required by charter.
i
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3.2	 RELIABILITY SECTION
The primary role of the Reliability Section is to provide direct assistance in
the areas of reliability engineering, reliability analysis, component selection
and component analysis. The department provides indirect support in the way
of statistical evaluation of test results and trend evaluation. This particular
operation insures that sufficient inter-program communication is maintained con-
cerning the general performance and quality of the electronic hardware developed
and produced by SCI Systems, Inc.
The organization of the Reliability section is presented by the functional task
chart on the following page. This chart outlines the assigned duties of each
operating group within the department.
In general, SCI's Reliability Section operates to fulfill the exacting analytical
requirements of the applicable military and civilian aerospace programs, The
a
experience gained onprevious programs will allow the several tasks to be per- 	 fa
a
formed using the most recent component information available coupled with exact-
ing electrical and mechanical designs.
3.3	 PROGRAM REVIEW
MSFC and SCI representatives,will jointly conduct formal reviews of the re'..ia-
bility program to assess its progress and effectiveness and to determi- ,Ae the
need for adjustments or changes. These formal reviews will norma'.ly be con-
ducted in conjunction with scheduled program design reviews.
These reviews will be in addition to the normal i*n ;louse program surveillance
performed by the Reliability section,
7	 `1
Y	 A
C7
v
s
	
Z
Cl)
	
o
 
y
J
	
V
W 
y
	
Q
 
Z
 
W
C
C
 
0
 
=
ZQ
ui
fr.
^
J J
Q
 
Q
 
C7
Ww
Wc
c
LL Q
J
W
c
c
d
c!3
W0
U
a
y
LLw
cncn 
z
0O
QZ
J
U`
} 
C7
F.. Z
a>
Q}
Z}
dp
}
m
W
O
J
'^
J
F
—
Q, Z
co
m
m
N
Z
co
W
 C
7Z
C
L
 
W
JW
JW
LL
Wcr-
~
w
w
	
J
JmQ
NZ
W
0
a
c
F
-
V
0
Zp
d
t
W
_
N
r
a
.
f
t
G1
Z
CL
LU
z
p
W
Z
Q
k
0O
.
zW
yt/1
OU
V .
0
W
H-
V
Q
F
J	 I	 ^	 I	 I
3.4
	
SUPPLIER CONTROL
SCI will impose, and enforce by surveillance if required, specific reliability
requirements upon suppliers of major procured items. The extent of requirements
imposed b SCI will
	 y	 ^,l be based on the performance demands of the items, as well
as, the degree of confidence previously established with the sources of these
items. In all cases, procured items will be controlled by adequate military
specification, NASA or SCI control drawings which insure the quality and relia-
bility of the items used on the program. Supplier design review meetings will
be required for development of major components and will satisfy the intent of
GSFC Document No. SMM-300-01 Revision A. These design review meetings will
include participation by MSFC and SCI representatives.
Modifications to existing supplier OSO-8 equipment will be evaluated for com-
patibility with the Electronics Assembly (ERA). Major modifications and/or
additions will be controlled by design specifications which detail the perform-
I
ance demands of the Electronics Assembly. Appendix III of this plan presents
the procedures used by SCI in preparation of component specifications.
j
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4.0	 PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS
In order to assure that part applications conform to derating ground rules
and to determine part failure based on applied stresses, a Reliability Engineer
will conduct a Parts Stress Analysis on all piece parts in circuits that have
changed from the OSO-8 configuration and on all new hardware. A general des-
cription of procedures to be used in performing this analysis are as follows.
The initial step in any stress analysis is to identify the critical parameters
associated with the failure of each type of component. These parameters then
form the basis for identifying potential component problem areas. This is
performed by making use of the recommended derating guides on which failure rates
are based as well as review of part vendor specifications and part failure his-
tories. The derating guidelines given in Appendix B of GFSC PPL 12 will be used
for the ERA design.
After identification of the critical parameters of each type of component, the
system components are listed on their appropriate work sheets by generic type
and reference designators. The forms to be used for this purpose are included
in the Appendix I, of this plan. Critical parameters, as described above, are
then entered under the appropriate section for each component.
Each component and parameter is then considered with the intent of insuring it
cannot be overstressed under any circuit performance because of basic electrical
laws. A few of the more useful laws are listed below,
(1) The peak voltage to any component cannot exceed the maximum differential
source voltage of the component in the absence of energy storage elements
(inductors, capacitors, etc.).
(2) The average power to a passive element cannot be greater than the maximum
available differential voltage squared divided by the component's internal
resistance.
(3) The peak current in a component cannot be greater than the maximum available 	
i
differential voltage to the component divided by the component's internal
resistance.	 {
I
(4) The maximum current in a transistor occurs during saturation.
(5) The average power dissipated by a single transistor is less than the square 	
7
`l
of 1/2 the maximum differential voltage divided by the emitter and collector
i
series resistance.	
a
In those cases where the derated maximum parameters can be insured as described
above the component's application is inherently reliable and affords the maximum 	 j
life of operating components.
The enormous demands on circuit performance and optimization of packages dictate
that some components must be operationally dependent. In these cases additional
f	 considerations must be made to insure they are within acceptable stress levels
under all modes of operation.
11
,..	 _	
--	
l
After completion of the stress analysis as described above, the results will
be summarized and reviewed to identify possible prob—m areas and corrective
actions needed in view of the system requirements. It should be noted that this
approach to a formal stress analysis is relatively free of measurement technique
fallacies which might be encountered by other approaches and provides maximum
identification of potential problem areas.
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	5.0	 FAILURE MODE, EFFECT AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA)
SCI will conduct an FMECA down to the functional subassembly level on all units
of the ERA that change from the OSO-8 configuration and all new hardware. These
analyses will be conducted and maintained current throughout the design stage to
determine the possible modes of failure which may be eliminated or minimized by
design corrective action. The results of this analysis will le available for
design reviews.
Since each FMECA is unique, procedures for performing FMECA must be flexible to
the extent that they are effective and consistent with the severity of require-
ments on the equipment. The following paragraphs will present the general pro-
cedures used in performing this analysis on new designs at SCI. It is felt that
these procedures provide enough definition to ensure effectiveness of the analysis
without restricting the necessary flexibility.
	
5.1
	 SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS
System level analysis must be initiated in the very early stages of design in
order that abnormalities can be identified and necessary corrective action taken
for achievement of effective system performance with the least amount of cost
impact. In most cases this analysis is in progress on an informal basis during
the proposal effort and prior to any contract award.
After contract award, a formal approach to FMECA is begun on the system level.
.This system level analysis provides the ground work for determining the need for
additional and more detailed studies of sub-systems, assemblies, and components.-
</	 I
contractual requirements of system performance and determining the effect of
design changes which might be incorporated from time to time.
The system level and associated additional studies are periodically reviewed to
insure their applicability to present design and contractual requirements. Figure
5-1 is a typical form used for this analysis. The following paragraphs will pre-
sent particular techniques used in completing this form.
5.2	 IDENTIFICATION OF INPUTS AND OUTPUTS
The first step in performing this analysis is to identify all functional outputs
of the system. In the case of electrical signals it is usually effective to
consider the interconnection points to other functions or systems. In cases of
other types of inputs and outputs such as mechanical, they are individually con-
sidered in terms of the effectiveness of the analysis.	
-
In the early stages of design the identification should be by functional descrip-
tion only with the addition of reference designators to each functional descrip-
tion as the equipment definition progresses. 	 I
,
5.3
	
DETERMINATION OF FAILURE EFFECTS
After proper identification of inputs and outputs, each will be entered on the
work sheet and the possibility of internal secondary failures as 'a result of in-
I	 advertent shorted or open conditions will be considered. In addition to these 	 1,
considerations the system effect of loss of signal will be entered. Special
considerations will be given when various modes of signal loss would result in
I
1	 significantly different effects. In these cases, failure modes will be itemized
i
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for the function and separate effects will be identified.
5.4	 CRITICALITY OF FAILURE
The effect of each failure mode on system performance must be considered. This
will be done by assigning a criticality factor to each to reflect their effect
on system operation. Those failures that reflect adverse system performance
toward major mission goals will then be separately identified.
5.5	 SUB-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
After a system level analysis has been formulated, the need for additional
	
J
analysis can be identified and major emphasis can be placed on possible problem
areas which have adverse effects on successful system performance or personnel
safety. The techniques used to perform additional studies will vary with the
nature of problems encountered. When the complex nature of the possible problems
warrant, a detailed study will be performed on the subsystem level similar to
that performed for system level analysis. In any event the analysis will identi-
fy all critical and most probable modes of failure.
f1
60	 STANDARDIZATION OF DESIGN PRACTICES
SCI will utilize existing design and processing practices, procedures and
standards insofar as practicable, modifying them as necessary to meet the
quality and reliability requirements of the program. In consideration of the
reliability demands on this program, the component application and derating
guide in Appendix II of this document will be used in equipment design.
Part types used on newly designed hardware will be chosen from the types already
	
i
used on the OSO-8 hardware as much as possible for standardization of parts.
4
i
4
i
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SCI will plan, schedule and conduct equipment design reviews at the following
program milestones.
(a) Pre-layout Review - At the formulation of design concept and prior to
fabrication of any hardware.
(b) Pre-prototype Review - At the completion of detailed design and prior to
fabrication of prototype hardware.
(c) Post-qualification Test Review - At the completion of qualification testing.
These design reviews will be attended by cognizant representatives of SCI and
MSFC. Mutually agreed to design review minutes, including action items, will
be provided the MSFC Program Manager.
s
i
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8.0	 MALFUNCTION REPORTING AND FAILURE ANALYSIS
The existing SCI failure reporting system will be utilized on the HRUV Pro-
gram. Failures will be documented starting at the time of first power appli-
cation at the subassembly level. All failures occurring during end-item test-
ing at SCI will be formally reported to MSFC along with the results of failure
analysis and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of the failure.
The failure analysis group is responsible for the failure analysis and the trend
forecasting operations. The information made available by this group will allow
the program office to maintain control over the reliability of the hardware
from piece-part to finished end-item as it passes through the various manufactur-
ing operations. An important task of the program manager is to maintain the in-
tegrity of the hardware through the production process. The analysis of in-pro-
cess failures by this group provides company management with sufficient informa-
tion so that additional resources may be allotted as required to maintain an
orderly production flow. A closed loop failure reporting system will be utilized
in this program. The cause of failure will be determined for each failure event
after final assembly to allow timely corrective action to be initiated to prevent
recurrence of similar problems. The following paragraph is a general description
of the failure reporting system.
The reporting system is a joint operation of the Quality Assurance and Reliability
Sections. The duties of the two groups are delegated so that each group performs
the activities most closely associated with its primary program responsibilities
In the case of a malfunction during acceptance testing the Quality Assurance
representative obtains the initial data concerning the malfunction, drafts a
formal report regarding the incident, and reports the event to the Reliability
I
19
C4.	 _i
Section. Representatives from these two groups (with participation b- she
associated design group as required) decide if a detail :..,alysis of the
malfunction is necessary. If such an n::µ ysis is required, the responsible
cLbked to perform the analysis to determine the cause of the
failure. 'Phis information is then utilized to establish corrective action to
prevent similar problems with later items. The data made available by each
analysis is stored in the Data Bank which is maintained by the Reliability
Section. The information is coded so that modern data processing techniques
can be utilized in analysis of the information. A copy of the form used as
input to the data bank is shown in Figure 8-1 and 'the associated codes in
Figure 8-2. As one can easily see, the information may be recalled in any
grouping necessary to investigate similar problems. Figure 8-3 is the form
used for initial failure notification.
t
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S^l FORM NO.	 -17	 Rev. 11 74
RELIABILITY FAILURE ANALYSIS FORM
1F 5 1
LOG NO. REQUESTOR	
NROA
43	 50	 51
PROGRAM
J
7	 8	 1
FINAL
ASSEMBLY
11
S/N
15
PART
NO.
52	 65
I H
16	 17	 19
ASSEMBLY
NO.3
20
S/NH
21	 24
SORT
66	 67	 70	 71	 74Comb anent	 DATER•cerence
Jesig.	 CODE
5	 26	 28
ASSEMBLY
N0. 2
r-29-1
FI
S/N
30	 33
34
ASSEMBLY
NO.1
r-371
S/N
3942.	 75	 76	 77	 78	 80
1	 DEVICE	 MANUF.	 FAILURE
'	 I	 TYPE
	 MODE
EXTERNAL VISUAL
NO DEFECTS q 	 DEFECTIVE: SOLPiR/WELD q 	 PACKAGE q 	 LEAD qMARKING	 q 	 OTHER	 q
X — RAY
N/A q 	 NO DISCREPANCIcS q 	 DISCREPANCY q
HERMETICITY
GROSS FINE
N/A q q PASS q FAIL q PASS	 q FAIL
ELC'CTRICAL ';'EST
N/A 1.1	 GOLD q 	 OPEN q 	 SHORT q 	 OUT OF SPEC. q 	 VIBRATION q 	 TEMP:
INTERN
	 VISUAL, ',L
N/A 0	 NO DEFECTS q FOREIGN MATERIAL q 	 BOND/WIRE FAILURE q 	 ELECTRICAL OVERSTRESS q
METALLIZATION DEFECT q 	 OTHER
COMMENTS
FIGURE 8-1
21
1	 RELIABILITY FAILURE ANALYSIS DATA BANK CODES
REQUESTOR (6) DEVICE TYPE (75)
A-	 Acceptance Test Procedure (A.T.P) Part
F
Type
B-	 Burn-In
C-	 Customer Returned Material (C.R.M.) A- Relay
I-	 In Process Failure 	 (I.P.F) B- Board
P-	 Pre- A.T.P. C- Capacitor
Q-	 Quality Test Procedure (Q.T.P) D- Diode
R-	 Reliability Test Procedure 	 (R.T.P) E- Flex Cable
F- FET
G- Connector
FAILURE MODE
	 (78) H- Hybrid I.C.
E^ I- Intergrated Circuit
A-	 No Entry
	
2-	 ^'Ian[Ofat uring J- Transformer
B-	 Good	 Irregularity K- Crystal
C-	 Open	 3-	 Mechanical L- Coil
D-	 Short	 Misalignment M- Memory
E-	 Out of Tolerance	 4- R- Resistor
F-	 Degraded	 5-	 Workmanship S- Switch
{	 G-	 Cracked Element	 6-	 Improper T- Transistor
If-	 Unbonded Chip	 Installation U- Mechanical Component
I-	 Epoxy
	
7-	 Secondary Failure V- Module
J-	 Wire	 8-	 Trouble-Shooting W- OPTO-Electronic Device
K-	 Die Bond
	
9-	 Poor Wetting
L-	 Post Bond ^F S CT MAU U VrAaTURH rqj	 I R R E
-01 UL-A- e I T ^(M-	 Beam Lead
,N-	 External Lead
0-	 Chipout
P-	 Oxide Fault
	 )
Q-	 Hermeticity
R-	 Metalization
S-	 Contamination
T-	 Foreign Material
U-	 Electrical Overstress
V-	 Weld or Solder Connection
W-	 Wire Dress PROGRAM	 5I )
X-	 Unknown Mechanism
Y-
	 Broken Package Same as Drawing Numbers.
Z-	 Improper Removal
SORT (66)
DRAWING NO.
	 (7)	 (16)	 (25)	 (34) A-
3i;
Starting 1 January 1975.
I	 A-1995	 Lockheed	 I-1533	 Titan (65) WIRE INTERCONNECT METALIZATION
8-2595	 "	 J-3395	 Titan
C-3344	 "	 K-3457	 Hughes A- AL/AL
D-1932	 "	 L-3631	 F15 B- Beam Lead
	 y
E-2532	 "	 M-2602	 F15 C- Gold/A1
F-3532	 "'	 N-3895
	 Titan D- GotGold
  4044
	 F-15 E- AL/Gold Post
H-3512	 '^	 P_ 3604	 F- i5 F- Gold/Gold Post
Q^
R— aZ- Other
3
FIGURE 8-2
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a
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1
i	 p
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A B C D
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y ^
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YES	 NO
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3.2	 RELIABILITY SECTION
The primary role of the Reliability Section is to provide direct assistance in
the areas of reliability engineering, reliability analysis, component selection
and component analysis. The department provides indirect support in the way
of statistical evaluation of test results and trend evaluation. This particular
operation insures that sufficient inter-program communication is maintained con-
cerning the general performance and quality of the electronic hardware developed
and produced by SCI Systems, Inc.
The organization of the Reliability section is presented by the functional task
chart on the following page. This chart outlines the assigned duties of each
operating group within the department.
In general, SCI's Reliability Section operates to fulfill the exacting analytical
requirements of the applicable military and civilian aerospace programs, The
experience gained on previous programs will allow the several tasks to be per-
formed using the most recent component information available coupled with exact-
ing electrical and mechanical designs.
i	 !
3.3,	 PROGRAM REVIEW
MSFC and SCI representatives,will jointly conduct formal reviews of the relia-
bility program to assess its progress and effectiveness and to determine the
need for adjustments or changes. These formal reviews will normally be con-
i
ducted in conjunction with scheduled program design reviews.
y
These reviews will be in addition to the normal in-house program surveillance
3
performed by the Reli::bility section.
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3.4
	
SUPPLIER CONTROL
SCI will impose, and enforce by surveillance if required, specific reliability
requirements upon suppliers of major procured items. The extent of requirements
imposed by SCI will be based on the performance demands of the items, as well
as, the degree of confidence previously established with the sources of these
items. In all cases, procured items will be controlled by adequate military 	 o- ,
specification, NASA or SCI control drawings which insure the quality and relia-
bility of the items used on the program. Supplier design review meetings will
be required for development of major components and will satisfy the intent of
GSFC Document No. SMM-300-01 Revision A. These design review meetings will
include participation by MSFC and SCI representatives.
Modifications to existing supplier OSO-8 equipment will be evaluated for com-
patibility with the Electronics Assembly (ERA). Major modifications and/or
additions will be controlled by design specifications which detail the perform-
ance demands of the Electron}cs Assembly. Appendix III of this plan presents
the procedures used by SCI I in preparation of component specifications.
r	 l	 i	 I	 1!	 f^
4.0	 PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS
In order to assure that part applications conform to derating ground rules
and to determine part failure based on applied stresses, a Reliability Engineer
will conduct a Parts Stress Analysis on all piece parts in circuits that have
changed from the OSO-8 configuration and on all new hardware. A general des-
cription of procedures to be used in performing this analysis are as follows.
The initial step in any stress analysis is to identify the critical parameters
associated with the failure of each type of component. These parameters then
form the basis for identifying potential component problem areas. This is
performed by making use of the recommended derating guides on which failure rates
are based as well as review of part vendor specifications and part failure his-
tories. The derating guidelines given in Appendix B of GFSC PPL 12 will be used
for the ERA design.
After identification of the critical parameters of each type of component, the
system components are listed on their appropriate work sheets by generic type
and reference designators. The forms to be used for this purpose are included
in the Appendix I of this plan. Critical parameters, as described above, are
then entered under the appropriate section for each component.
Each component and parameter is then considered with the intent of insuring it
i
cannot be overstressed under any circuit performance because of basic electrical
laws. A few of the more useful laws are listed below.
i
f.
10
L_J--
(1) The peak voltage to any component cannot exceed the maximum differential
source voltage of the component in the absence of energy storage elements
(inductors, capacitors, etc.).
(2) The average power to a passive element cannot be greater than the maximum
available differential voltage squared divided by the component's internal
resistance.
(3) The peak current in a component cannotbe greater than the maximum available
differential voltage to the component divided by the component's internal
resistance.
(4) The maximum current in a transistor occurs during saturation.
(5) The average power dissipated by a single transistor is less than the square
of 1/2 the maximum differential voltage divided by the emitter and collector
series resistance.
In those cases where the derated maximum parameters can be insured as described
4
above the component's application is inherently reliable and affords the maximum
life of operating components. 	 j
i
d
The enormous demands on circuit performance and optimization of packages dictate
that some components must be operationally dependent. In these cases additional 	 !
considerations must be made to insure they are within acceptable stress levels
3
under all modes of operation.
a
11
After completion of the stress analysis as described above, the results will
be summarized and reviewed to identify possible prob,m areas and corrective
actions needed in view of the system requirements. It should be noted that this
approach to a formal stress analysis is relatively free of measurement technique
fallacies which might be encountered by other approaches and provides maximum
identification of potential problem areas.
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5.0	 FAILURE MODE, EFFECT AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA)
SCI will conduct an FMECA down to the functional subassembly level on all units
of the ERA that change from the OSO-8 configuration and all new hardware. These
analyses will be conducted and maintained current throughout the design stage to
determine the possible modes of failure which may be eliminated or minimized by
design corrective action. The results of this analysis will be. available for
design reviews.
Since each FMECA is unique, procedures for performing FMECA must be flexible to
the extent that they are effective and consistent with the severity of require-
ments on the equipment. The following paragraphs will present the general pro-
cedures used in performing this analysis on new designs at SCI. It is felt that
these procedures provide enough definition to ensure effectiveness of the analysis
without restricting the necessary flexibility.
5.1	 SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS
System level analysis must be initiated in the very early stages of design in
order that abnormalities can be identified and necessary corrective action taken
k:	 for achievement of effective system performance with the least amount of cost
impact. In most cases this analysis is in progress on an informal basis during
i	 the proposal effort and prior to any contract award.
t After contract award, a formal approach to FMECA is begun on the system level.
This system level analysis provides the ground work for determining the need for
`
	
	 additional and more detailed studies of sub-systems, assemblies, and components.
In addition, this analysis provides a yard stick in assessing the achievement of
rcontractual requirements of system performance and determining the effect of
design changes which might be incorporated from time to time.
The system level and associated additional studies are periodically reviewed to
insure their applicability to present design and contractual requirements. Figure
5-1 is a typical form used for this analysis. The following paragraphs will pre-
sent particular techniques used in completing this form.
	
5.2	 IDENTIFICATION OF INPUTS AND OUTPUTS
The first step in performing this analysis is to identify all functional outputs
of the system. In the case of electrical signals it is usually effective to
consider the interconnection points to other functions or systems. In cases of
other types of inputs and outputs such as mechanical, they are individually con-
sidered in terms of the effectiveness of the analysis.
In the early stages of design the identification should be by functional descrip-
tion only with the addition of reference designators to each functional descrip-
tion as the equipment definition progresses.
	
5.3	 DETERMINATION OF FAILURE EFFECTS
After proper identification of inputs and outputs, each will be entered on the
work sheet and the possibility of internal secondary failures as'a result of in-
advertent shorted or open conditions will be considered. In addition to these
considerations the system effect of loss of signal will be entered. Special
r
considerations will be given when various modes of signal loss would result in
significantly different effects. In these cases, failure modes will be itemized
1
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for the function and separate effects will be identified.
	
5.4	 CRITICALITY OF FAILURE
The effect of each failure mode on system performance must be considered. This
will be done by assigning a criticz`ity factor to each to reflect their effect
on system operation. Those failures that reflect adverse system performance
toward major mission goals will then be separately identified.
	
5,-5	 SUB-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
After a system level analysis has been formulated, the need for additional
analysis can be identified and major emphasis can be placed on possible problem
areas which have adverse effects on successful system performance or personnel
safety. The techniques used to perform additional studies will vary with the
nature of problems encountered. When the complex nature of the possible problems
warrant, a detailed study will be performed on the subsystem level similar to
that performed for system level analysis. In any event the analysis will identi-
fy all critical and most probable modes of failure.
9
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6.0	 STANDARDIZATION OF DESIGN PRACTICES
SCI will utilize existing design and processing practices, procedures and
standards insofar as practicable, modifying them as necessary to meet the
quality and reliability requirements of the program. In consideration of the
reliability demands on this program, the component application and derating
guide in Appendix II of this document will be used in equipment design.
Part types used on newly designed hardware will be chosen from the types already
used on the OSO-8 hardware as much as possible for standardization of parts.
7.0	 DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM
SCI will plan, schedule and conduct equipment design reviews at the following
program milestones.
(a) Pre-layout Review - At the formulation of design concept and prior to
fabrication of any hardware.
(b) Pre-prototype Review - At the completion of detailed design and prior to
fabrication of prototype hardware.
(c) Post-qualification Test Review - At the completion of qualification testing.
These design reviews will be attended by cognizant representatives of SCI and
MSFC. Mutually agreed to design review minutes, including action items, will
be provided the MSFC Program Manager.
3
i
8.0	 MALFUNCTION REPORTING AND FAILURE ANALYSIS
The existing SCI failure reporting system will be utilized on the HRUV Pro-
gram. Failures will be documented starting at the time of first power appli-
cation at the subassembly level. All failures occurring during end-item test-
ing at SCI will be formally reported to MSFC along with the results of failure
analysis and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of the failure.
The failure analysis group is responsible for the failure analysis and the trend
forecasting operations. The information made available by this group will allow
the program office to maintain control over the reliability of the hardware
from piece-part to finished end-item as it passes through the various manufactur-
ing operations. An important task of the program manager is to maintain the in-
tegrity of the hardware through the production process. The analysis of in-pro-
cess failures by this group provides company management with sufficient informa-
tion so that additional resources may be allotted as required to maintain an
orderly production flow. A closed loop failure reporting system will be utilized
in this program. The cause of failure will be determined for each failure event
after final assembly to allow timely corrective action to be initiated to prevent
recurrence of similar problems. The following paragraph is a general description
of the failure reporting system.
The reporting system is a joint operation of the Quality Assurance and Reliability
Sections. The duties of the two groups are delegated so that each group performs
the activities most closely associated with its primary program responsibilities
In the case of a malfunction during acceptance testing the Quality Assurance 	 i
representative obtains the initial data concerning the malfunction, drafts a
formal report regarding the incident, and reports the event to the Reliability
19
Section. Representatives from these two groups (with participation by the
associated design group as required) decide if a detail analysis of the
malfunction is necessary. If such an analysis is required, the responsible
group(s) will be asked to perform the analysis to determine the cause of the
failure, 'Phis information is then utilized to establish corrective action to
prevent similar problems with later items. The data made available by each
analysis is stored in the Data Bank which is maintained by the Reliability
Section. The information is coded so that modern data processing techniques
can be utilized in analysis of the information. A copy of the form used as
input to the data bank is shown in Figure 8-1 and the associated codes in
Figure 8--2. As one can easily see, the information may be recalled in any
	
I
grouping necessary to investigate similar problems. Figure 8-3 is the foam
used for initial failure notification.
L21
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SCI FORM NO.
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RELIABILITY FAILURE ANALYSIS FORM
1	 5
LOG NO.
 6
REQUESTOR
43
NROA
50 51
PROGRAM
7	 8	 1
FINAL
ASSEMBLY
11	 15
S/N
52
PART
NO.
65
16	 17	 19
ASSEMBLY
N0.3
20	 21	 24
S/NF1 66	 CoponentSORT	 ReferenceDesig.
 Li
_L7_	 70
DATE
CODE
71	 74
26	 28
ASSEMBLY
NO. 2
r 2-9-1 	30	 1	 1 33
S/N
34	 35	 37
ASSEMBLY
NO. 1
3	 39	 42
S/N
75	 76	 7 7-1
DEVICE	
MANUF.
	
FAILURE
TYPE	 MODE
78 1	 1 80
EXTERNAL VISUAL
NO DEFECTS q 	 DEFECTIVE:	 SOLDER/WELD q 	 PACKAGE q 	 LEAD qMARKING
	 q 	 OTHER	 q
X — RAY
N/A q 	 NO DISCREPANCIES q 	 DISCREPANCY q
HERMETICITY
— GROSS	 FINE
N/A q q PASS	 q FAIL	 q PASS	 q FAIL
ELECTRICAL TEST
`J/A q 	 GOOD q 	 OPEN q 	 SHORT q 	 OUT OF SPEC. q 	 VIBRATION q 	 TEMP.
INTERNAL VISUAL
N/A q 	 NO DEFECTS q FOREIGN MATERIAL q 	 BOND/WIRE FAILURE q ELECTRICAL OVERSTRESS q
METALLIZATION DEFECT q 	 OTHER
COMMENTS
FIGURE 8-1
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RELIABILITY FAILURE ANALYSIS DATA BANK CODES
REQUESTOR (6) DEVICE TYPE (75)
A-	 Acceptance Test Procedure (A.T.P) Part Type
B-	 Burn-In
C-	 Customer Returned Material (C.R.M.) A- Relay
I-	 In Process Failure
	 (I.P.F) B- Board
P-	 Pre- A.T.P. C- Capacitor
Q-	 Quality Test Procedure (Q.T.P) D- Diode
R-	 Reliability Test Procedure (R.T.P) E- Flex Cable
F- FET
G- Connector
FAILURE MODE
	 (78) H- Hybrid I.C.
%an%^f R
I- Intergrated Circuit
A-	 No Entry
	
2- uring J- Transformer
B-	 Good Irregularity K- Crystal
C-	 Open	 3- Mechanical L- Coil	 ...,
D-	 Short Misalignment M- Memory
E-	 Out of Tolerance	 4- R- Resistor
F-	 Degraded	 5- Workmanship S- Switch
G-	 Cracked Element	 6- Improper T- Transistor
H-	 Unbonded Chip Installation U- Mechanical Component
I-	 Epoxy	 7- Secondary Failure V- Module
J-	 Wire	 8- Trouble-Shooting W- OPTO-Electronic Device
K-	 Die Bond
	
9- Poor Wetting
L-	 Post Bond	 ScT MAMUfiAcwRitAi
M-	 Beam. Lead	 / R R E:C^ 
Ln-A. P I T Y
N-	 External Lead
0-	 Chipout
P-	 Oxide Fault
	 )
Q-	 Hermeticity
R-	 Metalization
S-	 Contamination
T-	 Foreign Material
U-	 Electrical Overstress
V-	 Weld or Solder Connection
W-	 Wire Dress PROGRAM (51)
X-	 Unknown Mechanism
Y-	 Broken Package Same as Drawing Numbers.	 {
Z-	 Improper Removal
SORT (66)
DRAWING NO.
	 (7)	 (16)	 (25) (34) A- Starting 1 January 1975.
	
j
A-1995
	
Lockheed	 1-.1533 Titan (65) WIRE,/INTERCONNECT METALIZATION
-B-2595	 "	 J-3395 Titan_
C-3344	 "	 K-3457 Hughes A- AL/AL
	 '.
D-1932	 "	 L-3631 F1S B- Beam Lead
E-2532	 "	 M-2602 F15 C- Gold/A1
F-3532	 "	 N-3895 Titan D- Got #Gold
G-2512	 "	 0- F-15 E- AL/Gold Post
	 3
H-3512	 "	 p- 3604	 F-15 F- Gold/Gold Post
R- Z- Other
1
FIGURE 8-2
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PROGRAM NUMBER ASSEMBLY FAILURE RECORD FRA NUMBER
DATE	 AlrPERATOR AZOESCRIPTION OF DEFECT/ISOLATION W A7
} TIMTMWIENCE	 A3J
m
yW
N
a Al
aO NEXT OPERATION	 ABH SERIAL NO.	 70
DATE	 BlrFERATOR 132DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT/ISOLATION RESULTS 	 B7
M
O
2 ITEM NAME	 84
J
m PART	 .
yy
W
N
N13n-MRATION	 138
a
DATE	 C7PERATOR 1	 C7
N TniMUENCE
OZ
ITEM NAME	 C4J
m
.
a NEXT7MRATION
Q SERIAL No.
DATE	 DlrPER TOR	 DZDESCRI Tr6W'6r'5TMT/ISOLXTION RESUCTS	 D7
O Tnl-aWENCE
	 -0
Z
ITEM NAME>J
m
2 PWRT NO.	 D5W
y
Q
X	 D8
SERIAL NO.
REPAIR DEFECTIVE ITEM TO BE REPLACED NEW ITEM APPROVAL
NAME REF. DES. CLEVEL
w A B C DO
w A B C D
OC A 8 C D
Q
W A B C D
ir
A 8 C D
D TESTSEOUENCE
YES	 NO
y
LuV
TESTSEQUENCE ACCEPTED
YES	 NO
W W
X jr
E ACCEPTED
YES	 NO
TEST SEQUENCE ACCEPTED
YES	 NO
W N.Z
^O
CA
o d
FIGURE 8-3
FINAL APPROVAL
SCU FORM NO. 810-114 (Rev. 11/74 Q.
_C.	 23 REL. ENG.
9.0	 PARTS AND MATERIALS PROGRAM
SCI will, as a general policy, select parts for the system on the basis of
'proven qualification of each part and material for its application(s) and select
them from sources employing effective reliability and quality programs in their
manufacture. Every effort will be made to choose items already qualified to
pertinent specifications and to use the minumum practicable number of styles of
each generic type. When selecting items previously qualified. SCI will devote
particular attention to currentness of data, applicability of basis of qualifica-
tion, and adequacy of specifications.
The drawings, specifications, and procedures required to properly implement this
program will be drawn from existing SCI documentation files whenever possible.
These documents will be reviewed to make certain that they are adequate for the
intended purpose. In situations where the existing documentation is inadequate,
special supplements or new procedures will be written. Where applicable, the
documentation will be placed under formal control.
The GSFC Preferred Parts List (PPL) will be used as a guide for selection of new
parts on the HRUV program. A parts list, materials list and process list will
be maintained and submitted to the MSFC Program Manager for SMM Project approval.
New design will utilize part types already used on the OSO-8 hardware, as much
- as possible, to make use of parts already on hand from that program, but only
after approval for use in SMM hardware has been given by the MSFC Program Man-
ager for the SMM Project.
24
SCI will impose screening requirements on all parts used in the fabrication of
flight hardware. Inventory on hand from the previous contract for OSO-8 hard-
ware must be approved by the MSFC Program Manager for the SMM Project prior
to use in flight hardware. This screening will be performed as an integral part
of the testing performed by the manufacturer, or during part screening at SCI
prior to installation into equipment. Figure 9-1 presents the screening	
..,
matrix intended for use on flight hardware components.
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10.0	 EQUIPMENT LOGS
SCI will maintain complete equipment status logs on the equipment in compliance
with configuration management requirements. Each log will be identified to the
equipment to which it pertains and will be maintained in chronological order and
account for all periods of time including idle periods and any movements of the
item. Entries will be complete, self-explanatory, and include the following:
a. Date and time of entry.
b. Identity of test or inspection.
c. Environmental conditions.
d. Characteristics being investigated,
e. Parameter measurements,
f. Complete identification of instrumentation used including
serial number and calibration date.
g. Failure observations and failure report reference.
a
h. Accumulated operating time.
i
i. Cumulative number of duty cycles to date.
j. Discrepancies between the item tested and pertinent
specifications or drawings.
k. Repair and maintenance record.
1. Record of pertinent unusual or questionable occurrences
involving the equipment.
m. Action taken to have "quick fixes" in test formalized as
design changes,	 j
n. Identity of individual making entry.
27	
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11.0	 RELIABILITY REPORTING
Monthly reports on the status of reliability activities will be prepared by
SCI for transmittal to MSFC as a part of the Monthly Product Assurance Status
Report.
Reports will include, but not be limited to, the following sections:
1. Technical Progress - Significant achievements that occurred.
within the reporting period, the cumulative status of the
reliability effort versus the scheduled program, etc.
2. Review of Significant Events - Comments on the major design
changes and their effect on reliability; analysis of
significant failures occurring during the reporting period;
discussion of current and/or anticipated reliability problem
areas, with recommendations for solution, etc.-
10.0	 EQUIPMENT LOGS
SCI will maintain complete equipment siatus logs on the equipment in compliance
with configuration management requirements. Each log will be identified to the
equipment to which it pertains and will be maintained in chronological order and
account for all periods of time including idle periods and any movements of the
item. Entries will be complete, self-explanatory, and include the following:
a. Date and time of entry.
b. Identity of test or inspection.
c. Environmental conditions.
d. Characteristics being investigated.
e. Parameter measurements.
f. Complete identification of instrumentation used including
serial number and calibration date.
g. Failure observations and failure report reference.
h. Accumulated operating time.
i. Cumulative number of duty cycles to date.
j. Discrepancies between the item tested and pertinent
specifications or drawings.
k. Repair and maintenance record.
1. Record of pertinent unusual or questionable occurrences
involving the equipment.
m. Action taken to have "quick fixes" in test formalized as
design changes.
n. Identity of individual making entry.
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11.0	 RELIABILITY REPORTING
Monthly reports on the status of reliability activities will be prepared by
SCI for transmittal to MSFC as a part of the Monthly Product Assurance Status
Report.
Reports will include, but not be limited to, the following sections:
1. 'Technical Progress - Significant achievements that occurred
within the reporting period, the cumulative status of the
reliability effort versus the scheduled program, etc.
2. Review of Significant Events - Comments on	 e major design
changes and their effect on reliability; analysis of
significant failures occurring during the reporting period;
discussion of current and/or anticipated reliability problem
